DEFENCE & SECURITY OUTLOOK ON PRC (CHINA)
China is a powerful Asian country and has evolved as a leading regional and global military power  in  the  21st  century.  Safeguarding its  territorial  integrity  while  maintaining domestic  and  regional  stability  has  driven  the country towards a rapid expansion of its military  might.  While  strongly  defending  its  territory, China has also adopted an assertive policy   over   strategic   issues   in   the   Asian   continent.  The  military  organisation  of   the  country, called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),  is  controlled  by  the  Central  Military  Commission (CMC) which is the supreme defence  policy  making  body.  The  Chairman  of  the CMC is the Commander-in-Chief  of  the  PLA.  The  active  forces  of   PLA  consist  of   the  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force,  PLA  Rocket  Force  (erstwhile  Second  Artillery  Corps), military    schools    and    national    defence    scientific research institutions. China   has   rapidly   modernised   its   armed   forces in the aftermath of the two Gulf Wars fought  in  1990  and  2003.  Once  following “limited  local  war”  strategy  evolved  from Mao Zedong’s “protracted people’s war”, the PLA of today has adopted the “people’s war under hi-tech conditions” tactics as part of its modernisation drive that began in 1993. The new warfare tactics rely more on advanced technology  than  on  troops.  The  “people’s war” strategy, based on large-scale land and guerrilla warfare methods, was designed to confront  mainly  Japan  and  the  erstwhile Soviet Union. However, the doctrine became redundant  following  the  disintegration  of Soviet  Union  in  1991.  Shifting  away  from such warfare methodology to a modern, hi-tech condition was necessitated after the rise of the US as the supreme world power.Of late, the PLA has followed the doctrine of  “active  defence”  relying  on  state-of-the-art  military  hardware,  modern  high-tech  weapons,  precision  guided  munitions, sophisticated  command  &  control  systems  coupled  with  a  strict  military  training regime  and  large-scale  use  of   information  technology.  The  new  military  doctrine along with structural changes in its armed forces,  development  of   pre-emptive  strike  capability,  change  in  warfare  methodology, C4I2SR,   ground,   sea   and   airspace-based   surveillance   and   information   technology   have   gained   importance   in   present-day   Chinese  armed  forces.  By  making  efforts  to   acquire   advanced   military   capabilities,   China  has  steadily  transformed  its  posture  to that of an aggressive power. The country has  ramped  up  efforts  to  build  and  deploy  strategically  critical  missile  systems  capable  of   not  only  defending  its  territory  but  also  launch   offensive   strikes   against   potential   enemy installations. Advanced and extensive researches   have   been   undertaken   in   the   past  decades  to  develop  anti-ship  ballistic  missile   system   (ASBM),   ballistic   missile   defence  (BMD)  capabilities  and  even  anti-satellite weapons (ASW) to carry out space war. All these powerful weapons have been developed as part of China’s “anti-access and area-denial” (A2AD) strategy. In 2010, China for the first time conducted a ground-based mid-course  interceptor  missile  test  which demonstrated  its  capability  to  track  down and   destroy   mid-course   ballistic   missiles,   with  many  defence  experts  believing  that the  country  was  nearing  to  achieve  BMD capability. In January 2013, PRC conducted another   such   test   to   exhibit   that   it   is   increasing its potential in missile interception capabilities. The test was followed by another one in 2014 during which a land-based mid-course missile interceptor successfully traced, tracked and destroyed a ballistic missile flying in  outer  space.  In  February  2018,  Beijing announced yet another successful test firing of   its  ground-based  mid-course  anti-missile  interceptor system.  Back  in  2007,  the  country  had  also  tested  a   ground-based   direct-ascent   anti-satellite   (ASAT) weapon to destroy one of its defunct weather  satellites,  proving  its  capability  to attack  satellites  and  space  assets  in  low-Earth  orbit.  The  successful  ASAT  mission  demonstrated  China’s  prowess  to  launch space warfare missions and was viewed by many  countries  as  a  serious  threat  to  their  vital  space-based  systems.  In  May  2013, Beijing launched a rocket into space which later re-entered Earth’s atmosphere above the Indian Ocean. According to military experts, the test was a new interceptor weapon that could  be  used  to  destroy  satellites  in  orbit.  Another test of a similar weapon, designated Dong  Neng-3  (DN-3),  was  conducted  in October 2015. In  yet  another  new  military  technical breakthrough in January 2014, China test flew a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) capable of cruising at a top speed of Mach 10. The HGV test,  marking  a  step  beyond  China’s  ASBM  programme, featured a slower, shorter-range manoeuvrable   re-entry   vehicle   (RV). 
The   ultra-high-speed  vehicle  was  launched  into space  by  an  intercontinental  ballistic  missile.  A second test flight of the new system was carried out in August 2014 followed by one more  test  reported  in  December  2014.  In June  2015,  the  Chinese  Defence  Ministry confirmed  the  fourth  test  of  hypersonic nuclear delivery vehicle followed by a second test that year in August 2015 and yet another test in November 2015, which was the sixth test launch of the new weapon. The most recent test of  the glider vehicle took place in April 2016. In October 2017, China for the first time publicly revealed the images of the hypersonic vehicle along with a hypersonic wind tunnel that is being used for testing the HGV. The country continued to undertake more  tests  involving  hypersonic  technology  in 2018. Another  frontier  that  has  come  to  occupy  centre-stage in China’s overall military strategy is the strengthening of its asymmetric warfare capabilities  involving  cyberspace.  China  has  accelerated its activities in cyberspace domain by developing newer capabilities to not only defend its information technology network but even launch offensive operations against its adversaries. Acknowledging the potentiality of   information  technology  in  military  arena  which can have wider implications from both tactical as well strategic perspectives, China has swiftly built up its information warfare capability  to  launch  computer  network-based war that could paralyse and upset the entire  civilian  and  military  apparatus  of   a  country by taking control of  its information &  information-based  systems.  Development  of  electronic  countermeasure  weapons, cyber  espionage  and  carrying  out  attacks  on internet network are becoming potential tools  for  China  to  launch  cyberspace-based  operations. One  of   the  most  vital  aspects  of   modern  Chinese military build-up is the rapid growth of  its  maritime  power.  As  the  country expands  its  economic  horizons  and  realises  the increased importance of  sea lanes as vital trading  routes,  it  is  adopting  a  strategy  of   “sea control” and “sea denial” to ascertain its  supremacy  over  water  resources  within its   territory   and   beyond.   The   country’s   navy  has  focused  on  strengthening  its  anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air warfare capabilities while building up a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent. The PLA’s air power too has taken significant strides  in  the  present  century  by  deploying  new-generation stealth warplanes/ bombers, combat    helicopters,    drones,    long-range    transporters,  refuelling  tankers  along  with advanced  weapon  systems  to  carry  out integrated  operations  alongside  the  Army  and  Navy.  According  to  a  Pentagon  report,  China’s air force is “pursuing modernisation on  a  scale  unprecedented  in  its  history  and  is  rapidly  closing  the  gap  with  Western air   forces   across   a   broad   spectrum   of    capabilities    including    aircraft,    command    and  control,  jammers,  electronic  warfare and  data-links.”  The  steady  enhancement and  expansion  of   PLA’s  military  aviation  capabilities is clearly marked by the fact that the country announced the establishment of  an  air  defence  identification  zone  (ADIZ) over a swath of the disputed East China Sea in December 2013. The move was aimed at putting the Air Force at the forefront in the eventuality of a war and thereby supporting the  country’s  expanded  maritime  power projection.  In  recent  past,  China  has  also  invoked  its  right  to  set  up  an  ADIZ  in  the  hotly disputed South China Sea region, more so   after   an   International   Court   ruled   in   favour of  Philippines over a disputed region in the SCS. In a recent decision taken by the CPC, China has  announced  to  optimize  the  size  and  structure  of  its  army,  while  also  focusing on  optimizing  the  function  and  institution  settings of  the Central Military Commission. In September 2015, Beijing announced that its 2.3 million strong People’s Liberation Army, the world’s largest military, would be cut by 3,00,000 troops. The troops cut exercise was completed  in  2018  and  the  PLAGF  now remains a two-million-strong force. A  2017  report  further  stated  that  number of troops in the PLA Ground Forces would be  reduced  to  less  than  one  million  in  the  coming years even as the troops strength of  PLA Navy, PLA Strategic Support Force and PLA Rocket Force would be increased while the PLA Air Force’s active service personnel will remain the same.
The country has also announced to strengthen the joint operational command authority under the CMC, and the theatre joint operation command system. The new  joint  operational  command  structure would be completed by 2020.  In yet another sweeping reform carried out in 2015, Beijing has integrated the PLA area commands  overseeing  two  neighbouring countries   –   India   and   Pakistan,   thereby   junking   its   Soviet-era   model   for   a   US-style   joint   command   structure   to   fortify   the  ruling  Communist  Party’s  control.  Of   the   seven   military   area   commands   –   at   Beijing,  Nanjing,  Chengdu,  Jinan,  Shenyang,  Lanzhou  and  Guangzhou  –  the  Chengdu military command was in charge of security along  India’s  Eastern  sector  in  the  Tibet  region  including  Arunachal  Pradesh  while the Lanzhou military command looked after the Western sector, including the Kashmir region and Pakistan. As per the new strategic zone plan unveiled by President Xi, both the Chengdu and Lanzhou have been integrated into  a  strategic  command  region,  making  it  perhaps  the  biggest  areas  for  the  PLA.  The  overhaul is aimed at moving away from an army-centric system towards a Western-style Joint Command in which the Army, Navy and Air Force are equally represented. In early 2016, the PLA was reformed again so as to include five new Theatre Commands by  replacing  the  seven  previously  existing  Military   Regions. 
The   Defence   Ministry   announced that the new Theatre Commands –  North,  South,  East,  West  and  Central  –  under the administration of the CMC, would be  based  on  the  functions  and  structure  of   the  military  regions  (MRs)  they  replaced,  with  improved  mechanisms  for  command and  logistics.  The  PLA  would  establish  a Transitional Work Office to ensure a smooth transition  from  the  old  MRs  to  the  new Theatre  Commands.  As  part  of   the  overall  military  reforms  initiated  by  President  Xi  Jinping, who also heads the decision-making Central   Military   Commission   (CMC)   and   also  assumed  the  role  of   Commander-in-Chief   of   the  Joint  Battle  Command  Centre  of the CMC in 2016, the PLA has dissolved the  four  existing  general  headquarters  and  instead set up 15 new organisations including the  Headquarters  of  the  Joint  Force.  The restructuring  of   the  CMC  has  been  done  to   consolidate   its   authority   and   further   centralise   the   structure   of    the   People’s   Liberation  Army.  All  the  reforms  have  been  announced  to  transform  the  PLA  into  a  leaner  fighting  force  with  improved  joint operations capability. 
The urge to grow economically and militarily has  driven  China  to  exert  its  influence  in and  around  the  resource-rich  areas  of   Asia-Pacific  region,  particularly  in  the  South China  Sea  and  East  China  Sea  which  are major  trading  routes  and  are  also  believed  to  treasure  huge  amounts  of   oil  and  natural  gas along with fishing and mineral resources. The  Asian  giant  has  intensified  efforts  to expand  its  footprint  in  the  SCS,  ECS  and  recently,  even  in  the  Indian  Ocean  Region  (IOR) by building up new harbours and other infrastructural  setups,  thereby  adding  to  the  worry  of  the  neighbouring  littoral  states which are at loggerheads with Beijing. In the coming decades, the PLAN is likely to bolster its  presence  in  the  IOR  significantly  by deploying  one  or  more  aircraft  carrier  battle  groups  (CBGs)  and  building  more  naval bases,  according  to  military  analysts.  China’s  growing  power  projection  and  aggressive stance  over  regional  and  littoral  issues  has  alarmed  the  international  community  even  though  Beijing  maintains  that  it  follows  a “non-offensive  strategy”  with  a  “need  to expand” while safeguarding its “rights and interests”. The growing territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region, with China being at the centre, have flared up regional tensions and  invited  global  attention  and  concern.  Moreover, the highly secretive military plans and  pursuits  by  the  Communist  China  have  cast  a  blurred  picture  of   the  country’s  real  ambitions and intentions in the longer run. In July 2019, the country released its latest Defence White Paper which, among other aspects   assesses   the   PLA’s   progress   on   modernisation   and   military   reforms.   The   report also states the official stance of Beijing and  its  response  to  the  evolving  strategic  realities  of  the  Asia-Pacific  and  beyond. Besides,  it  puts  light  on  a  number  of   key  military  weapons  and  platforms  that  have been commissioned into service of  late 2019.